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INTRODUCTION 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) is home to 
mineral riches1 and an immense tropical rainforest containing a 
number of endangered species of animals.2  Formerly a Belgian 
colony, Congo survived almost one hundred years of Belgian 
                                                          
 1. See Emily Wax, In Congo, Peace Eludes Its U.N. Keepers, WASH. POST, Mar. 
28, 2005, at A12. 
 2. See United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”), USAID-
Congo: Welcome, http://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/countries/ 
drcongo/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2005) (providing background on the DRC and its 
global significance). 
1
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exploitation3 before Colonel Joseph Mobutu took over the country in 
a coup in 1965 and changed its name to Zaire.4  The DRC was known 
as Zaire from 1965 until 1997.5  United States literary audiences 
became familiar with the nation in Joseph Conrad’s Heart of 
Darkness,6 and later, in the 1998 novel The Poisonwood Bible.7  Since 
1998 the DRC has been ravaged by a complex war involving the 
territorial interests of other African nations including Angola, 
Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, and ambitions of 
internecine rebel forces.8 
In 1999 the United Nations Security Council authorized 
peacekeeping forces in the DRC and created the U.N. Mission in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“MONUC”).9  The majority of 
peacekeepers appear to perform their duties with professionalism, 
and some have even died during the course of their work.10  The 
actions of others, however, have led to a spate of newspaper articles in 
2004-2005 reporting rape, torture, the fathering of “peacekeeper 
babies” and their subsequent desertion,11 and pornographic 
videotaping of Congolese women and children.12  A report by the 
United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (“OIOS”) 
released in March 2005 chronicled the alarming findings and yielded 
                                                          
 3. See ZAIRE IN PICTURES 30-38 (Lerner Geography Dept. ed. 1992). 
 4. See id. at 37-38. 
 5. See CITIZENS FOR GLOBAL SOLUTIONS, IN UNCHARTED WATERS:  SEEKING JUSTICE 
BEFORE THE ATROCITIES HAVE STOPPED 14 (2004), available at http://www. 
globalsolutions.org/programs/law_justice/icc/resources/uncharted_waters.pdf  
[hereinafter UNCHARTED WATERS] (explaining that in addition to renaming himself 
“Mobutu Sese Seko,” Mobutu also changed the name of the country to Zaire). 
 6. JOSEPH CONRAD, HEART OF DARKNESS (Penguin Books 1976) (1876). 
 7. BARBARA KINGSOLVER, THE POISONWOOD BIBLE (1998). 
 8. See UNCHARTED WATERS, supra note 5, at 14 (tracing the violent and unstable 
history of the DRC). 
 9. See S.C. Res. 1279, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1279 (Nov. 30, 1999) (recognizing the 
need to halt human rights violations and other violence in the DRC). 
 10. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, Militia Fighters Kill [Nine] U.N. Peacekeepers in Congo 
as Instability Continues, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2005, at A6 (noting that the 
peacekeepers often offer much-needed protection for DRC citizens). 
 11. See ELISABETH REHN & ELLEN JOHNSON SIRLEAF, WOMEN, WAR AND PEACE: THE 
INDEPENDENT EXPERTS’ ASSESSMENT ON THE IMPACT OF ARMED CONFLICT ON WOMEN AND 
WOMEN’S ROLE IN PEACE-BUILDING 71 (UNIFEM 2002), available at http://www. 
parliament.gov.za/pls/portal30/docs/FOLDER/PARLIAMENTARY_INFORMATIO
N/PUBLICATIONS/UNIFEM/INDEX.HTM (explaining that, in Liberia for 
example, as of 2002, 6,600 children were registered as being children of 
peacekeepers).  In Kosovo songs played on the radio warning young girls not to have 
children with peacekeepers.  Id. 
 12. See, e.g., Marc Lacey, In Congo War, Even Peacekeepers Add to Horror, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 18, 2004, at A1; Colum Lynch, U.N. Sexual Abuse Alleged in Congo, 
WASH. POST, Dec. 16, 2004, at A16; Colum Lynch, Report on Abuse Urges DNA Tests 
for Peacekeepers, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2005, at  A15 [hereinafter Report on Abuse]. 
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a wave of criticism and reform.13 
In the United States, members of the 109th Congress responded by 
introducing bills in March 2005 addressing peacekeeper abuse of 
women and children, urging that the U.N. suspend payment of 
peacekeeping funds and the U.S. withhold military assistance to 
countries where there is evidence of abuse and a failure to investigate 
and punish the conduct.14  At the request of the DRC, the 
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) has begun an investigation of 
atrocity crimes committed during the course of the war.15  Because 
the DRC is a party to the Rome Statute creating the ICC, the court has 
jurisdiction over genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity 
committed after July 1, 2002, when the temporal jurisdiction of the 
ICC went into effect.16  This is noteworthy, for the court lacks 
jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute crimes occurring before July 
1, 2002, so that most of the crimes committed during the war would 
not fall within the temporal jurisdiction of the court. 
The peacekeeper abuse scandal could not come at a worse time for 
the United Nations.  In the past year it suffered blows such as the Oil-
for-Food debacle, allegations of sexual harassment against the head of 
the United Nations High Commission for Refugees,17 and calls from 
conservative senators in the United States Congress for United 
Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan to resign.18 
This Article describes both the recent report and corresponding 
U.N. efforts to examine abuses within peacekeeping ranks in the DRC 
and also suggests measures of accountability to halt future abuse. 
I. THE PEACEKEEPERS 
In an effort to promote stability in the DRC, in 1999 the United 
Nations Security Council authorized peacekeeping forces in the DRC 
and created the U.N. Mission in the Democratic Republic of the 
                                                          
 13. See Report on Abuse, supra note 12 (noting that U.N. Secretary General Kofi 
Annan requested an investigation into the abuses alleged in the DRC). 
 14. See Protection of Vulnerable Populations During Humanitarian Emergencies 
Act of 2005, S. 559, 109th Cong. § 305 (2005); Women and Children in Crisis and 
Conflict Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 1413, 109th Cong. § 305 (2005). 
 15. See Marc Lacey, Novelty in Congo: U.N. Investigates a Massacre, N.Y. TIMES, 
Dec. 24, 2004, at A13. 
 16. See UNCHARTED WATERS, supra note 5, at 18. 
 17. See Colum Lynch, U.N. Official Quits in Harassment Case, WASH. POST, Feb. 
21, 2005, at A20 (reporting that Ruud Lubbers, Head of UNHCR, offered his letter of 
resignation upon pressure from Kofi Annan, after a number of employees accused 
him of sexual harassment). 
 18. See Love at Second Sight, ECONOMIST, Mar. 26-Apr. 1, 2005, at 31 (noting that 
at the end of 2004, Senator Norm Coleman (R-MN) called for Annan’s resignation 
because of the Oil-for-Food scandal). 
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Congo.  Since then, the U.N. has renewed the mandate of MONUC 
and increased the number of peacekeeeping forces in the DRC.  The 
DRC now hosts the U.N.’s largest peacekeeping mission with 16,047 
soldiers and over two thousand civilian employees.19 
The peacekeeping forces have proven indispensable in protecting 
civilians in the DRC.  They help protect thousands of civilians from 
the rapes, murders, and looting of armed militiamen.  Peacekeepers 
forcibly disarm militia groups that have been terrorizing local 
people.20  Johannes Wedenig, the head of UNICEF in Goma, DRC, 
reportedly said that “‘[m]ilitias have been attacking civilians, and if 
MONUC was not protecting the people there would be no one to rely 
on.  They’d be at the mercy of the armed men, who have been raping 
and killing and burning villages.’”21 
U.N. peacekeepers perform their duties in difficult circumstances 
and often at great personal danger.  As recently as February 2005, 
militia forces killed nine Bangladeshi peacekeepers in the eastern part 
of the DRC as they were attempting to protect a camp with thousands 
of people who had left their homes because of militia attacks.  A total 
of sixty peacekeepers have been killed since the inception of the 
MONUC peacekeeping mission.22  Later in February 2005, U.N. 
peacekeepers killed fifty militiamen in a battle after being fired upon 
by the same militia forces suspected of having killed the Bangladeshi 
peacekeepers.23  In March 2005, the U.N. peacekeepers killed an 
additional thirty-eight militiamen in a day after a U.N. deadline for 
voluntary disarmament by the militias expired.24  What is striking 
about the battle is that the peacekeepers were taking an armed stance, 
due in large part to a more aggressive Security Council mandate that 
allows the soldiers to protect civilians.25 
                                                          
 19. See MONUC, Facts and Figures (2005), http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/ 
missions/monuc/facts.html [hereinafter Facts and Figures] (stating that the 
peacekeepers are from a wide array of nations including Bangladesh, France, India, 
Morocco, Nepal, Pakistan, and South Africa, while the Special Representative of the 
Secretary General and Chief of the peacekeeping mission is William Lacy Swing, an 
American). 
 20. See Lacey, supra note 10 (explaining that peacekeepers have become more 
aggressive in their efforts). 
 21. Id. 
 22. See Facts and Figures, supra note 19. 
 23. See Emily Wax, U.N. Troops in Congo Kill [Fifty] Militiamen in Gun Battle, 
WASH.  POST, Mar. 3, 2005, at A17. 
 24. Reuters, U.N. Troops Kill [Thirty-eight] Militiamen in Congo Raid, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 2, 2005. 
 25. See  S.C. Res. 1592, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1592 (Mar. 30, 2005) (authorizing 
MONUC to “use all necessary means, within its capabilities and in the areas where its 
armed units are deployed, to deter any attempt at the use of force to threaten the 
political process and to ensure the protection of civilians under imminent threat of 
physical violence, from any armed group, foreign or Congolese, in particular the ex-
4
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II.  THE SCANDAL 
In 2004, stories of the alleged involvement in rape and “survival 
sex” with women and children began to emerge.  The U.N. is 
investigating one case in which a French logistics employee 
videotaped himself torturing and abusing naked girls.26  Other 
peacekeepers allegedly lured girls as young as ten years old to have 
sex in exchange for a cup of milk, a few eggs, peanut butter or a 
dollar.27  Some reports told of girls raped by militias then abandoned 
by their families, who, desperate and starving, traded sex for small 
sums of money or food with the peacekeepers.  Girls claimed that they 
sometimes had sex with U.N. peacekeepers in U.N. cars or at 
peacekeeper camps.28  One article described a fourteen year-old girl 
named Yvette who is called the “one-dollar girl” or the kidogo 
usharati, “little prostitute,” in her community in Bunia because that is 
what she charges U.N. peacekeepers for sex.29  A militiaman raped 
Yvette when she was ten years old; when she sought counseling at a 
women’s group she was informed that while she had done nothing 
wrong, no man would want her as a bride because she was no longer a 
virgin.  About having sex with the peacekeepers, Yvette said, “I’m sad 
about it.  But I needed the dollars.  I can’t go farm because of the 
militias.  Who will feed me?...  Sometimes it happens in U.N. cars, 
other times at the camp.  But at least they paid us.  I was worthless 
anyhow.  My honor was lost.”30  A militiaman also raped Francine, a 
friend of Yvette, when she went into a field to gather food, and now 
she, too, engages in sex with peacekeepers.  Francine is sixteen years 
old, and she described an incident where she had negotiated to have 
sex with one Moroccan peacekeeper but then five other Moroccan 
peacekeepers raped her.  Francine said, “I feel bad about what I did.  I 
don’t want to go through that again.”31 
III.  THE OFFICE OF INTERNAL OVERSIGHT SERVICES REPORT 
Media attention to allegations of sexual abuses by the DRC 
peacekeepers led the United Nations Division of Peacekeeping 
Operations (“DPKO”) and MONUC to ask the United Nations Office 
                                                          
FAR and the Interhamwe . . . .” ). 
 26. See Emily Wax, Congo’s Desperate ‘One-Dollar U.N. Girls,’ WASH. POST, Mar. 
21, 2005, at A1. 
 27. See Lacey, supra note 12; Colum Lynch, U.N. Envoy to Resign in Wake of Sex 
Scandal, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2005, at A14. 
 28. See Wax, supra note 26. 
 29. See id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Id. 
5
Notar: Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Wo
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006
418 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 14:2 
of Internal Oversight Services to investigate.32  Between May and 
September 2004, the OIOS carried out its investigation in Bunia, in 
the eastern part of the DRC, where 4,500 of the almost 14,000 troops 
in the DRC were located. 33  In early 2005, the OIOS issued its report.  
The OIOS investigated seventy-two allegations.  While some 
allegations involved women over eighteen years of age, the majority of 
the victims were between twelve and eighteen years old; many of the 
younger girls, aged eleven to fourteen, had sex with peacekeepers as a 
way to obtain food and small amounts of money. 34  Six of the cases 
involved under-age girls and were completely corroborated.35  In two 
cases, the evidence was “convincing but not fully substantiated,” and 
in eleven cases, there was evidence of peacekeeper sexual abuse, but it 
was not corroborated.36  In none of the nineteen cases did the 
peacekeepers admit to any wrongdoing.37 
The OIOS, in determining whether to recommend cases for action, 
appears to have set a high evidentiary threshold of substantiation and 
corroboration.  This is disturbing due to a number of factors.  The 
majority of the allegations appear to involve minors.  There may be 
underreporting of allegations because MONUC received complaints 
rather than a third party, and this may not be the best system to 
encourage reporting of complaints.  Further, there is an inequitable 
power differential between the women and the peacekeepers which 
could yield to exploitation.  Peacekeepers often are repatriated before 
the conclusion of the investigation, which contributes to a lack of 
accountability and timeliness in pursuing these complaints. 
The report of the OIOS to the Secretary General has several other 
troubling aspects.  First, the report states that while it was the intent of 
the OIOS to name the troop-contributing countries whose 
peacekeepers exploited women and girls in Bunia, the DPKO instead 
simply gave the investigative reports to the relevant countries so that 
they could take “appropriate action.”38  This lack of transparency 
regarding which countries provided the troops that allegedly 
committed the abuse smacks of political negotiations behind the 
                                                          
 32. See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Activities 
of the Office of Internal Oversight Services: Investigation by the Office of the Internal 
Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United 
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, U.N. Doc. 
A/59/661 (Jan. 5, 2005). 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at ¶ 11. 
 35. Id. at ¶ 10. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. See  id. at ¶ 49. 
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scenes to avoid the negative publicity that naming the countries would 
surely cause. 
Second, the OIOS notes that sexual activity between peacekeepers 
and local women and girls continued during the investigation despite 
general knowledge that the investigation was taking place.  This was 
evidenced by freshly used condoms near military posts and guard 
stations and indicates a lack of concern by peacekeepers about the 
possible repercussions of the investigation findings.  Indeed, the 
report states that “[w]ithout strong reinforcement of the legal 
requirements and prompt sanctions for violations, they may well 
continue this behaviour.” 39 
Third, the OIOS notes that while one troop contingent responded 
in a timely fashion to OIOS requests for information, two other 
contingents either did not provide information when requested or 
actually disrupted the investigation.40  This interference from senior 
level officers with an ongoing U.N. investigation is particularly 
troubling because it demonstrates how little deterrent effect an 
ongoing investigation has for preventing further crimes. 
The OIOS makes a number of recommendations that are 
applicable to other peacekeeping missions in addition to MONUC.  
The OIOS suggested that the DPKO train peacekeepers on possible 
sanctions for sexual abuse and exploitation and permanently exclude 
peacekeepers from peacekeeping missions if they are found to have 
committed sexual exploitation and abuse.41  The OIOS 
recommended that DPKO designate a third party such as local 
officials or non-governmental organizations to receive reports of 
abuse and report incidents of abuse to senior DPKO officials.42  The 
OIOS further advised that DPKO and MONUC create a prevention 
program staffed by experts on the sexual abuse of children.43  It 
urged the DPKO to instruct troop-contributing nations whose 
peacekeepers have been implicated to take “appropriate action” and 
inform the DPKO what steps these nations actually took.44  Sharing 
this sort of information might help to put peacekeepers on notice that 
their actions would have ramifications. 
The report also calls for the improvement of current programs to 
help the vulnerable population develop methods other than engaging 
                                                          
 39. Id. at ¶ 44. 
 40. See id. at ¶ 38. 
 41. See id. at ¶ 56. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at ¶ 49. 
7
Notar: Peacekeepers as Perpetrators: Sexual Exploitation and Abuse of Wo
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2006
420 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 14:2 
in survival sex to obtain food and other essentials.45 
IV.  RAMIFICATIONS OF THE REPORT 
As a result of the OIOS report, the U.N. Under-Secretary for 
Peacekeeping Operations sent a special investigative team to the DRC. 
46  The team created a sexual exploitation and abuse focal-point 
network composed of all U.N. agencies in the DRC.47  MONUC will 
ensure that meetings be held regularly to coordinate the provision of 
training and prevention for MONUC forces and aid to victims.48  The 
DPKO has also established an Internet site to help educate staff about 
what constitutes sexual abuse and exploitation, and it has created a 
curfew and strict rules regarding non-fraternization with the local 
people.49 
At the end of March 2005, the U.N. Security Council issued another 
resolution regarding the DRC.50  It extended MONUC’s mandate to 
October 2005, condemned the attack on the U.N. peacekeepers, and 
encouraged the transitional government to make progress toward 
holding elections.51  Reaffirming its concern about the sexual abuse 
and exploitation that U.N. personnel committed, it asked the 
Secretary General to ensure compliance with his zero tolerance policy 
on sexual abuse, and investigate and penalize those found to be 
responsible.52  The Security Council also urged troop-contributing 
nations to review the Secretary General’s March 2005 report on sexual 
abuse and exploitation and hold pre-deployment training sessions for 
their troops on the issue, as well as discipline any troops who commit 
abuse.53 
 
 
 
                                                          
 45. See id. at ¶ 50. 
 46. The Secretary-General, Seventeenth Report of the Secretary-General on the 
United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶ 64, 
U.N. Doc. S/2005/167 (March 15, 2005). 
 47. See id. at ¶ 65. 
 48. See id. 
 49. See id. at ¶¶ 67-68. 
 50. See S.C. Res. 1592, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1592 (Mar. 30, 2005). 
 51. See id. at ¶¶ 1, 8. 
 52. See id. at ¶ 11. 
 53. See id. at ¶ 12. 
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V.  REPORT CALLING FOR ELIMINATION OF SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND 
ABUSE 
In March 2005, the U.N. issued a comprehensive report 
recommending ways to prevent peacekeeper sexual exploitation and 
abuse.54  In the introduction to the report, U.N. Secretary General 
Kofi Annan specifically mentions the peacekeeper abuse in the DRC 
and how the peacekeeper abuse there highlights the need for 
preventative measures to deter future misconduct there and 
elsewhere.55  The report emphasized that peacekeeper sexual abuse 
and exploitation impugns the reputation of a mission and makes 
peacekeepers appear hypocritical when trying to advise foreign 
governments on international human rights norms.56 
The report avers that while there are efforts underway to address 
peacekeeper abuses, they have primarily been ad hoc responses, and 
what is needed is fundamental systemic change in the “prevention, 
identification, and response” to the problem. 57  It also cites the 
difficulty of applying different legal standards to sectors of the 
peacekeeping forces because of their varying status.58  Peacekeeping 
forces can consist of U.N. staff, volunteers, independent contractors, 
and members of national armies.  While U.N. staff and volunteers are 
governed by the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the 
United Nations, local law applies to individual contractors.  Members 
of national militaries engaged in U.N. peacekeeping missions 
generally are governed by Status of Forces agreements.59  Under 
Status of Forces agreements, the host country typically defers the 
exercise of disciplinary and criminal prosecution to the peacekeeper 
home country.60 
The report recommends that the Secretary General establish a 
permanent investigative body independent of the DPKO and 
peacekeeping missions.61  This entity should use modern standards of 
evidence-gathering and ensure that investigations comport with the 
standards of troop-contributing nations.62  Currently, some 
investigations collect evidence only to find it unusable because it does 
not comply with the requisite evidence collection techniques.  To 
                                                          
 54. See G.A. Res. 59/710, U.N. Doc. A/RES/59/710 (Mar. 24, 2005). 
 55. See id. 
 56. See id. at ¶ 10. 
 57. See id. at ¶ 7. 
 58. See id. at ¶¶ 14-22. 
 59. See id. 
 60. See id. at ¶ 19. 
 61. See id. at ¶ 32. 
 62. See id. 
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facilitate access to witnesses and evidence, the report suggests the use 
of on-site courts martial for serious criminal violations.63 
The report makes a number of suggestions to improve overall 
management and organizational responses to allegations of abuse.  
Senior managers should regularly set the tone that abuse will not be 
tolerated and train peacekeepers on standards of conduct and the 
U.N. policies preventing sexual exploitation and abuse.  Peacekeeper 
codes of conduct should be available in all of the languages that the 
peacekeepers speak; currently they are only published in the official 
languages of the U.N., which does not encompass all of the languages 
of the troop-contributing nations.64  Peacekeeping missions should 
reach out to local communities to explain the DPKO’s policies against 
exploitation and to allow local people to make complaints in 
confidence.  The report encourages peacekeeping missions to 
develop data systems to monitor allegations of abuse and report the 
outcome of investigations.  It calls for earmarked positions to 
implement the new measures, both in the field and at U.N. 
headquarters.  Echoing the requirements of Security Council 
Resolution 1325, it emphasizes the need for increased numbers of 
women in peacekeeping operations, especially because victims are 
more likely to feel comfortable reporting abuse to women rather than 
to men.65 
Presumably as a way to provide peacekeepers with leisure time 
activities other than sex, the report describes the lack of recreational 
facilities for peacekeepers and encourages peacekeeping missions to 
build athletic facilities, Internet cafes, and subsidize telephone lines so 
that peacekeepers may talk with their families and friends.66  In a 
reference to what occurred in the OIOS investigation in the DRC 
when at least two commanders failed to cooperate with the 
investigation, the report calls for the institution of financial penalties 
against commanders who fail to cooperate.67 
The report makes a number of suggestions to improve the DPKO 
response to victims.  For example, it calls for peacekeeping operations 
to provide emergency medical assistance to victims who accuse U.N. 
peacekeepers of abuse, to refer victims to other humanitarian 
organizations, including legal assistance entities, and to provide 
victims with information on the status of their complaint against 
                                                          
 63. See id. at ¶ 35. 
 64. See id. at ¶ 39. 
 65. See id. at ¶ 43. 
 66. See id. at ¶ 51. 
 67. See id. at ¶ 61. 
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peacekeepers upon the conclusion of an investigation.68  Recalling 
the International Criminal Court’s Victim’s Trust Fund, it encourages 
the U.N. to establish a voluntary trust fund for victims.69  Financial 
penalties assessed against peacekeepers found to have perpetrated 
abuse could help to provide resources to this fund. 
Addressing the problem of babies conceived as a result of 
peacekeeper liaisons with local women and girls, the report 
recommends conducting DNA testing to try to identify the fathers in 
order to ensure that the children are provided some financial 
assistance when the father returns to his home nation.70  While this 
recommendation is well-intentioned, the logistics of conducting DNA 
testing in a post-conflict situation when the mother is living in a 
refugee camp and the peacekeeper-father is leaving to return to his 
home nation boggles the mind. 
The report urges an international group of experts to be convened 
to study the problem of the immunity of peacekeepers from criminal 
prosecution and to examine whether an international convention is 
needed to ensure that those perpetrating crimes in host nations are 
held accountable.71 
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS RESULTING 
FROM THE PEACEKEEPER ABUSE 
The U.N. has recognized the applicability of a number of 
international human rights norms to its work in peacekeeping 
operations.  While the U.N. is not a state party to international human 
rights conventions, at least one commentator has argued that it 
remains subject to customary international law of human rights in 
carrying out its work.72  The U.N. has explicitly stated that sexual 
exploitation and abuse violate such universally recognized legal 
norms.73 
The U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(“UDHR”), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
                                                          
 68. See id. at ¶ 54. 
 69. See id. at ¶ 56. 
 70. See id. at ¶ 72. 
 71. See id. at ¶¶ 91-95. 
 72. See Jennifer Murray, Who Will Police the Peace-Builders?  The Failure to 
Establish Accountability for the Participation of United Nations Civilian Police in the 
Trafficking of Women in Post-Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, 34 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 475, 518-19 (2003) (commenting that the “[The International Court of 
Justice] found the United Nations to be ‘a subject of international law and capable of 
possessing international rights and duties’”). 
 73. See The Secretary-General, Secretary-General’s Bulletin, Special Measures for 
Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/13 
(Oct. 9, 2003). 
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(“ICCPR”), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”), and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) include a number of provisions that 
help to protect the rights of both women and children.  For example, 
the UN Charter,74 the UDHR,75 the ICCPR,76 and CEDAW77 
guarantee equality on the basis of sex.  Article 1(3) of the United 
Nations Charter states that one of the purposes of the U.N. lies in 
“promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for 
fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language, or religion.”78  The UHDR,79 the ICCPR,80 CEDAW,81 and 
the CRC82 provide for the right to life and security of person.  When 
peacekeepers sexually exploit women and children, they are 
contravening this right, particularly with respect to security. 
The UDHR,83 the ICCPR,84 CEDAW,85 and the CRC86 provide the 
                                                          
 74. U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 3. 
 75. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, art. 2, U.N. GAOR, 
3d Sess., 1st plen. Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR] 
(proclaiming “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this 
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, 
religion, political, or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other 
status”). 
 76. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, opened for signature 
Dec. 16, 1966, art. 2, 999 U.N.T.S. 221 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1976) [hereinafter 
ICCPR]. 
 77. See Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, art. 2, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 (entered into 
force Sept. 3, 1981) [hereinafter CEDAW]. 
 78. See UN.org, Chapter One: Principles and Purposes, http://www.un.org/ 
aboutun/charter/chapter1.htm (last visited April 26, 2006). 
 79. See UDHR, supra note 75, art. 3 (providing that “[e]veryone has the right to 
life, liberty, and security of person”). 
 80. See ICCPR, supra note 76, art. 6. 
 81. See CEDAW, supra note 77, General Recommendation 19 (11th session 
1992): 
Gender based violence, which impairs or nullifies the enjoyment by women 
of human rights and fundamental freedoms under general international law 
or under human rights conventions, is discrimination within the meaning of 
Article 1 of the Convention.  These rights and freedoms include:  (a) The 
right to life; (b) the right not to be subject to torture or to cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment; (c) The right to equal protection 
according to humanitarian norms in time of international or armed conflict; 
(d) the right to liberty and security of person; (e) The right to equal 
protection under the law; (f) The right to equality in the family; (g) The 
right to the highest standard attainable of physical and mental health; (h) 
The right to just and favorable conditions of work. 
 82. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20, 1989, 
art. 6, 1577 U.N.T.S. 44 (the DRC signed March 20, 1990 and ratified Sept. 27, 1990) 
[hereinafter CRC]. 
 83. See UDHR, supra note 75, art. 5. 
 84. See ICCPR, supra note 76, art. 7. 
 85. See CEDAW, supra note 77, General Recommendation 19 (11th session 
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right to be free from torture, cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment 
or punishment.  When peacekeepers sexually exploit women and 
girls, they violate this right particularly because of the great power 
differential between the peacekeepers and the women and children. 
A fundamental premise in the UDHR,87 the ICCPR,88 and 
CEDAW89 is that of equal protection before the law for both women 
and men.  In General Recommendation Number 19, the U.N. 
CEDAW Committee noted that discrimination includes gender-based 
violence that either is directed at women because they are women or 
affects them disproportionately.  Such violence includes acts that 
inflict mental and/or sexual harm or suffering, or threaten to commit 
such injury.90 
VII.  PROBLEMS OF ACCOUNTABILITY AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
REFORM 
The international community might attempt to hold peacekeepers 
criminally liable for sexual exploitation and abuse of women and 
children in a number of ways.  These include the International 
Criminal Court, prosecutions in national court systems and in the 
DRC, and the U.N. itself.  Barriers exist to almost all of these, 
however, including the temporal jurisdiction of the ICC, Article 98(2) 
agreements, the immunities of U.N. personnel specified in the Model 
Status of Forces Agreement, Article 16 of the Rome Statute, and the 
inability or unwillingness of national court systems to prosecute 
peacekeepers. 
A. The International Criminal Court (ICC) 
Attempting to hold peacekeepers accountable for their crimes in 
the ICC is unlikely to be successful for a number of reasons.  First, the 
jurisdiction of the court is limited under Article 5 to crimes of 
genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of 
aggression.  The abuses that the peacekeepers perpetrated do not 
appear to rise to the level of either genocide, or crimes against 
                                                          
1992). 
 86. See CRC, supra note 82, art. 19 (“State parties shall take all appropriate 
legislative, administrative, social and educational measures to protect the child from 
all forms of physical or mental violence, injury or abuse, neglect or negligent 
treatment, maltreatment or exploitation, including sexual abuse, while in the care of 
parent(s), legal guardian(s), or any other person who has the care of the child . . . .”). 
 87. See UDHR, supra note 75, art. 7. 
 88. See ICCPR, supra note 76, art. 3. 
 89. See CEDAW, supra note 77, art. 1. 
 90. See CEDAW, supra note 77, General Recommendation 19 (11th session 
1992). 
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humanity, as the Rome Statute, the authorizing treaty of the ICC, 
defines them.91  The crimes might arguably fall within the definition 
of “war crimes” as defined in the Rome statute,92 but the ICC 
prosecutor has indicated that he will only prosecute the most 
egregious crimes, and while the peacekeepers’ acts are heinous, they 
arguably do not rise to the level of the crimes upon which the 
Prosecutor should focus.  Even were the court to prosecute such 
crimes, as noted above, the court only has temporal jurisdiction for 
crimes that occurred after July 1, 2002, which may exclude conduct 
that occurred before then. 
B. Article 98(2) Agreements 
In addition to seeking immunity for U.S. military members under 
Article 16 of the Rome Statute, the U.S. has also been entering into 
bilateral treaties with other nations under Article 98(2) of the Rome 
Statute.  These “article 98 agreements” are aimed at preventing U.S. 
nationals from being investigated and prosecuted by the ICC, without 
any duty on the part of the U.S. to investigate and prosecute its 
nationals.93  The U.S. has entered into ninety-nine of these 
agreements as of April 2005.94 
In his article on the original intent of Article 98(2), David Scheffer, 
who served as the head of the U.S. delegation negotiating the Rome 
Statute during the Clinton Administration, opined that the article was 
never meant to allow impunity for those accused of genocide, war 
crimes, or crimes against humanity.  He argues that when the U.S. 
negotiated the Rome Statute, the U.S. sought to have U.S. service 
personnel subject to Status of Forces agreements and Status of 
Mission agreements for criminal prosecution, and to no other treaty 
such as the Rome Statute.  Article 98(2) was not intended to cover an 
individual’s private acts.95  Under this interpretation, peacekeepers’ 
acts committed outside of their official duties, such as sexual abuse 
                                                          
 91. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, opened for signature July 
17, 1998, art. 6-8, 37 I.L.M. 999 (defining “genocide” in article 6; “crimes against 
humanity” in article 7; and “war crimes” in article 8). 
 92. See id. at art. 8  (describing war crimes as including: committing outrages 
upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading treatment; 
committing rape, sexual slavery, enforced prostitution, forced pregnancy, enforced 
sterilization, or any other form of sexual violence also constituting a grave breach of 
the Geneva Convention). 
 93. See David A. Tallman, Note, Catch 98(2): Article 98 Agreements and the 
Dilemma of Treaty Conflict, 92 GEO. L.J. 1033, 1040 (2004) (noting that the U.S. has 
repeatedly attempted to avoid ICC jurisdiction over its peacekeepers). 
 94. See David Scheffer, Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute: America’s Original 
Intent, 3(2) J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 333, 335 (2005). 
 95. See id. at 338-40 (arguing that the U.S. only sought to increase the protection 
of U.S. nationals in foreign jurisdictions). 
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and exploitation, should not be covered by Article 98(2), but rather, 
prosecution would occur through a Status of Forces agreements or 
Status of Mission agreements. 
C. The American Service Members Protection Act 
In addition to pursuing bilateral agreements with other nations 
under Article 98(2) of the Rome Statute, the Bush Administration has 
been entering into agreements not to surrender our military 
personnel to the ICC for prosecution.  The Administration has made 
acceptance of these agreements a precondition for other nations to 
receive foreign and military assistance under the American Service 
Members Protection Act.96  Such agreements seem to be a misguided 
way to prevent U.S. peacekeepers from being prosecuted in 
international tribunals rather than to keep them from perpetrating 
crimes in the first place, where, arguably, a greater emphasis should 
be placed. 
D. Article 16 of the Rome Statute 
Further, U.S. peacekeepers have been exempt from the jurisdiction 
of the ICC through a number of mechanisms, including Article 16 of 
the Rome Statute.97  In 2002, the United States obtained Security 
Council Resolution 1422,98 giving immunity for one year to 
peacekeepers from nations that are not state parties to the Rome 
Statute.  The United States sought and received an extension of this 
immunity for another year in Security Council Resolution 1487.99  
When the U.S. and the U.K. sought to have a third extension of the 
immunity in 2004, however, the Security Council did not authorize it, 
probably because of the Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal.  Other 
nations on the Security Council did not want to give the U.S. military 
immunity from prosecution for their actions torturing prisoners in 
Iraq and Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.100  Some commentators argue that 
the drafters of the Rome statute never meant for Article 16 to be used 
to immunize peacekeepers from prosecution.101 
                                                          
 96. See id. at 350. 
 97. The U.S. convinced the U.N. Security Council to agree in 2003 to exempt 
U.S. service members from the Jurisdiction of the ICC through Article 16 of the 
Rome Statute; see also Frederic L. Kirgis, U.S. Drops Plan to Exempt G.I.s from U.N. 
Court, American Society for International Law, ASIL Insight, July 2004, 
http://www.asil.org/insights/insigh139.htm. 
 98. S.C. Res. 1422, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1422 (July 12, 2002). 
 99. S.C. Res. 1487, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1487 (June 12, 2003). 
 100. GEERT-JAN ALEXANDER KNOOPS, THE PROSECUTION AND DEFENSE OF 
PEACEKEEPERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 5-7 (2004). 
 101. Id. 
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XIII.  RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM 
The United Nations and troop-contributing nations should take a 
multi-prong approach to prevent further abuse from occurring and 
hold those accountable for perpetuating abuse.  The U.N. must 
periodically train and re-train peacekeepers on the codes of conduct, 
the prohibition against sexual exploitation and abuse, and other 
human rights laws.  It should take seriously the recommendation that 
it establish an independent body staffed by experts on sexual abuse of 
women and children to whom victims can make complaints.  To 
prevent peacekeepers alleged to have committed abuse from leaving a 
host nation while an investigation is pending, the U.N. should create a 
monitoring system that would permit it to check to ensure that there 
are no outstanding allegations of abuse before peacekeepers can be 
repatriated.  Status of Forces agreements should contain assurances 
that troop-contributing nations will investigate and prosecute any 
allegations of peacekeeper abuse, and, should countries fail to do so, 
those countries should be excluded from contributing peacekeeping 
forces in the future.  This latter suggestion could have the negative 
impact of reducing the total number of peacekeepers available 
worldwide for assignment, but it may help to improve the overall 
reputation of the U.N. 
While the U.N. states that it has a “zero tolerance” policy toward 
sexual abuse and its code of conduct for peacekeepers asserts that 
reprisals for abuse may constitute termination of employment, to date 
there have been no reports of such loss of employment for 
peacekeepers.  If the U.N. takes this issue seriously, it should follow its 
rhetoric and terminate peacekeepers found to have committed sexual 
crimes. 
The U.N. must also address the issue of sexism within its own ranks 
and make a concerted effort to hire and place well-qualified women 
in all ranks, but particularly at senior levels, in peacekeeping 
operations and throughout the institution. 
The U.N. should consider the underlying causes for women and 
girls seeking to engage in survival sex with peacekeepers in post-
conflict nations.  It may want to consider allowing a portion of 
peacekeeping mission funds to be spent on making tangible 
differences in the quality of life of the local people.102  Where there 
are large numbers of peacekeepers stationed, there should also be 
education and training programs, food distribution, and training 
                                                          
 102. The so-called “Brahimi” report suggested this.  See U.N. General Assembly, 
Report on the Panel of United Nations Peace Operations, Aug. 17, 2000, U.N. Doc. 
A/55/305 (reviewing comprehensively the whole question of peacekeeping 
operations in all their aspects). 
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about the causes of HIV/AIDS, so that when peacekeepers leave a 
nation, they have helped to improve the conditions rather than 
further traumatizing an already damaged populace. 
SUSAN A. NOTAR 
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